In the empirical literature on the relationship between the size and performance of school systems one finds reports of negative, negligible, and positive associations (Amos & Moody, 1981; Bidwell & Kasarda, 1975; Bridge, Judd, & Moock, 1979; Brookover, Beady, Flood, Schweitzer, & Wisenbaker, 1979; Burkhead, Fox, & Holland, 1967; Butler & Monk, 1985; Eberts, Kehoe, & Stone, 1984; Guthrie, 1979; Illinois State Board of Education, 1985; Michelson, 1972; Summers & Wolfe, 1977; Teeter, Bradley, & Shull, 1983; Turner, Camilli, Kroc, & Hoover, 1986; Walberg & Fowler, 1987) . Evidently, the current challenge in this field is to develop a theory that would reconcile the contradictory findings on the relationship. Our paper addresses this challenge; it will examine the relationship for both schools and school districts in light of new hypotheses about the mechanisms through This paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of The American Sociological Association, August, 1987 . We are indebted to Michael Gerber and Russell Rumberger for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
which the size of a school system influences system performance.
Our new hypotheses provide a framework for understanding the substantive basis of the various findings that have been reported on the size-performance relationship. In order to lay out this framework, it is necessary to present in some detail an argument about the mechanisms through which a school system's size may influence its performance. This theoretical exegesis is divided into three parts: positive mechanisms, negative mechanisms, and contingencies that affect the relative contributions of the positive and negative mechanisms to system performance.
Positive Mechanisms: Opportunities
As the number of pupils in a school system increases so does the system's budget and the munificence of its resources (Bidwell & Kasarda, 1975; Daft & Becker, 1980; Guthrie, Kleindorfer, Levin, & Stout, 1971) . Economies of scale contribute to the resource munificence of large systems (Chambers, 1981; Fox, 1981; Gooding & Wagner, 1985) . Although scale economies may or may not be substantial depending on a variety of factors, it can be said that large systems generally present decisionmakers with opportunities to realize important economies (e.g., by spreading capital costs).
There are mechanisms besides economies of scale that may contribute to the resource munificence of large school systems. The larger a system the greater its potential influence over the market (e.g., the state or district) from which it draws its resources (Aidrich & Pfeffer, 1976; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) . In the context of a stratification of power that is linked to system size, larger systems are more likely than smaller systems to regularly secure resources in amounts disproportionate to the number of pupils they serve.
Still another explanation of the resource munificence of large systems is suggested by studies of budget determination in the public sector (e.g., Wildavsky, 1964) . These studies indicate a pervasive pattern of incremental percentage increases in the budgets of public sector systems. Typically, such increases are requested and granted on the grounds of a need to maintain and improve quality of services; such requests are made whether the size of a system's client population is increasing, decreasing, or stable. When such requests are granted in the context of declining or stable client populations, larger systems will acquire greater absolute increments in their budgets than will smaller systems. While the influence of large systems on decisionmaking helps assure the maintenance and growth of their resources, the general practice of incrementing budgets on a percentage basis provides a more solid foundation for such maintenance and growth.
Large systems with munificent resources may offer high salaries in order to attract and retain expert personnel. They may more regularly maintain and upgrade their facilities and equipment. They may more easily establish and expand expert support staff and research and development activities. They may more thoroughly divide and specialize the labor of line personnel, while increasing the diversity of services rendered.
In short, the resources of large systems provide manifold opportunities for an improvement in system performance, so that the quality of services provided by a large school system is expected to be better than the quality of services provided by a small system, ceteris paribus.
Negative Mechanisms: Constraints Problems of coordination and control increase with system size (Blau, 1974; Blau & Schoenherr, 1971; Steiner, 1972) . With increases in system size, functional and spatial differentiation become more elaborate. Such differentiation makes it difficult to maintain a consensus about the system's priorities and the appropriate means for their achievement (Caplow, 1957; March, 1962; March & Simon, 1958) . Interpersonal and subunit conflicts consume time and energy that might otherwise be strictly focused on the improvement of the core production activities of the school system.
While line personnel rarely are actively involved in managerial disputes over resource allocations, their participation and morale is likely to be lower in a context of ongoing managerial (i.e., interdepartmental) controversies. The well documented negative effects of subunit size on absenteeism support this argument (Dalton, Toder, Spendolini, Fielding, & Porter, 1980) . In larger systems line personnel are more likely to be attentive to their interests as a distinctive group within the system; hence, in larger systems a greater proportion of the time and energy of line personnel may be focused on pursuing the collective welfare of their group sometimes, but certainly not always, at the expense of core production activities of the system. Bridges and Hallinan (1978) , for example, find that the amount of task-irrelevant communication increases with school size.
In line with this argument, it also has been suggested that the amount of free-riding tends to increase with system size. Barker's (1968) analysis suggests that as the number of service providers increases, these providers' sense of responsibility for the individual pupil decreases. In smaller school systems, the service providers recognize that School System Size, Performance pupil outcomes depend more strictly on their efforts and respond positively to this recognition via greater time, attention, and motivation.
In short, the internal complexity of larger systems increases the likelihood that, at any given point in time, a noteworthy proportion of the time and energy of the school system's staff will be directed to issues that do not directly bear on the delivery of services to pupils and that distract the teachers from their core service activities. An erosion of the average amount of time and energy allocated to core production activities is expected to constrain the improvement of system performance (Carroll, 1963; Wiley, 1976) .
An erosion in the average amount of time spent on direct production with increases in system size also may occur as a result of formal shifts of personnel from line production activities into administrative activities. This hypothesis has been pursued, with mixed results, in studies of the ratio of administrators to production personnel (Scott, 1975; Kimberly, 1976) . Whether ratios based on nominal classifications (e.g., job titles) accurately reflect the proportion of the total time and energy of a system that is devoted to administrative matters is arguable.
In larger systems, time and energy are not only more likely to be shifted away from core service activities, but also are more likely to be systematically shifted away from the majority of undistinguished pupils and towards the minority of exceptional pupils (Monk, 1987) . As the size of a pupil population increases, the occurrence of pupils with unusual problems is expected to become more frequent.
1 For example, small school systems rarely deal with pupils having severe learning or behavioral disorders while schools with sufficiently large pupil populations regularly encounter such cases. Whether because of a mandated or felt responsibility, the servicing of exceptional pupils tends to draw system resources in amounts that are disproportionate to the number of pupils involved. For example, local school districts are constrained by federal legislation to provide highly specialized services to handicapped children; at the same time, this legislation provides for a fraction of the costs of delivering the stipulated services (Nelson, 1982) . Hence, local school districts are forced to shift resources from general production settings (i.e., regular classrooms) to highly specialized production settings. Similar, but less formally determined, circumstances arise in local school districts when there are children of migrant farm workers, non-English-speaking children, or children from culturally and economically disadvantaged families.
A greater frequency of exceptional pupils will tend to increase the administrative complexity of a school system and reinforce the shift of resources from production activities to administration activities. Moreover, to the extent that an increase in the frequency of exceptional pupils fosters greater formal differentiation of functions and specialization of staff responsibilities, problems of communication, coordination, and control will increase. Finally, because of uncertainties about the best ways to deal with exceptional pupils and because of unsettled differences about the priority of rendering of services to exceptional pupils, the greater the frequency of exceptional pupils the more likely the occurrence of disagreement and resource allocation conflict.
Hence, inequalities in the amount and quality of resources allocated to categories of pupils will tend to emerge in larger school systems. The direct outcome of such inequalities is a relatively low ratio of resources per pupil for the majority of pupils with undistinguished servicing requirements. While the set of exceptional pupils may or may not benefit from the disproportionate attention they receive, the more certain consequence of such disproportionate attention is the generation of a constraint on the quality of services that might be rendered to the majority of pupils.
Contingencies: Socioeconomic Composition
The positive and negative mechanisms we have discussed are not necessarily of equal weight. If the positive effects of system size on performance (via opportunities) are greater than the negative effects of system size on performance (via constraints), then the total effect of size will be positive. If the negative effects outweigh the positive effects, then the total effect will be negative. The SES of a system's pupil population is hypothesized to effect the rates at which opportunities and constraints increase with system size and, hence, the observed net effect of system size on performance. Figure 1 displays the idea.
Opportunities. The rate at which a school system's budget increases with system size is likely to be heterogeneous across systems. The marginal rates are obviously associated with gross differences in the type of service that is provided. High schools' budgets, for example, are expected to increase at a different rate than elementary schools' budgets with each additional pupil they serve. Such differences reflect inequalities in the costs of providing different types of service.
Within the domain of a particular type of service, differences in rates among school systems will depend on the power of a system to extract resources from its environment; more politically powerful systems are expected to acquire more resources per additional pupil than less powerful systems. Differences in rates also will depend on the scarcity of resources in the system's environment: the scarcer the available resources, the lower the rate. For example, while the resources provided to systems of public education are driven mainly by enrollments, per pupil allocations differ depending on the wealth of local communities and states. Differences in rates also will depend on the commitment of the environment upon which the system depends for maintaining or improving the system's services. For example, the local communities in which public school systems are located differ in their commitment to excellence in education and, accordingly, differ in the amounts of additional resources they make available to systems upon an increase in the size of their pupil populations.
Studies of the distribution of public funds (e.g., Berry & Kasarda, 1977; Levy, Meltsner, & Wildavsky, 1974; Lineberry, 1975) suggest that the power of a system to extract resources from its environment, the wealth of the environment from which a system draws its resources, and the priority accorded to the delivery of high quality services all are associated with the SES of a system's client population. Systems with high SES clientele tend to have more resources than systems with low SES clientele. The various arguments for why this pattern arises stem from either the power differential of different SES brackets, their differences in wealth, or their differences in expectations and demands.
Accordingly, among human service systems in the public sector, we can expect that the rate at which resources increase with number of clients will depend on the SES of the system's clientele. Given our particular arguments about the positive effects of school system size on performance, via effects of size on opportunities for an improvement of system performance, it follows that positive effects of school system size on performance will increase in magnitude the higher the SES of a system's pupil population.
Constraints. We have argued that the fre-
FIGURE 1. A contingency model of the size-performance relationship
School System Size, Performance quency and severity of constraints on a school system's performance increase with the number of pupils the system serves. We have emphasized constraints of two sorts: general shifts of time and energy from core production activities to administration activities; particularistic shifts of time and energy from the majority of pupils with undistinguished servicing requirements to minorities of pupils with exceptional servicing requirements. We now elaborate this argument with the idea that the SES of a pupil population influences the rate at which such constraints occur with increases in the number of pupils.
When the units of analysis are populations, the incidence of severe cognitive, physical, behavioral, and social problems in a population is negatively associated with the general SES of the population. Such problems include criminality (delinquency), drug abuse, unemployment, high school dropout, inadequate nutrition, mental disease, and learning disability. The association is ecological; as such, it does not imply that a high SES individual is more problem-free than a low SES individual, only that the incidence of exceptional problems is higher in low SES populations than in high SES populations.
Given an association between the SES of a population and the incidence of exceptional problems, it is expected that (as the size of a pupil population grows) the marginal increase in the number of pupils with exceptional problems will be greater in low SES populations than in high SES populations. From our previous arguments about the manner in which systems typically respond to the occurrence of exceptional pupils, it follows that negative effects of school system size on performance will increase in magnitude the lower the SES of a system's pupil population.
Hypothesis of an Interaction
We expect that an increase in the SES of a pupil population will simultaneously strenghten the effect of size on opportunities for an improvement of system performance and diminish the effect of size on the frequency of constraints on system performance. The implication is that the effects of size on performance may be either positive or negative depending on the SES of a pupil population. Among high SES pupil populations, increasing size should generate few constraints and many opportunities, so that size may be positively related to performance. Among low SES pupil populations, increasing size should generate few opportunities and many constraints, so that size may be negatively related to performance. Our empirical effort in this paper evaluates whether there are grounds for such an interaction effect.
Methods
Our data were gathered by the state of California's Department of Education (California Assessment Program) as part of its census of the schools and school districts in the state during the 1983-84 academic year. For schools and school districts, the data include measures of the number, SES, and academic achievement of pupils in four grades: third, sixth, eighth, and 12th. We have followed California's organization of these data in presenting our results by grade in both the schools and school districts. Analysis by grade level permits an assessment of the reliability of findings across various types of academic settings and pupil populations at different stages of maturity and academic development. For an additional check on reliability, we also divided the school systems into two broad areal divisions (metropolitan and nonmetropolitan regions of California) and replicated our analysis of grade levels within each of these areal divisions.
Variables
School system size. Our measure of the size of a school system is the number of pupils at a particular grade level in a school or school district. We used the natural logarithm of the number of pupils in a grade as a way of dealing with the presence of a few extremely large systems in the distributions and with some nonlinearity in the effects of size.
School system SES. The SES of third and sixth grades was derived from teachers' reports of the occupational status of the parents of each pupil in their class. The occupational categories were coded (1) unskilled, (2) semi-skilled or skilled, and (3) semiprofessional or professional. The SES of eighth and 12th grades was derived from information provided by pupils on the educational attainment of their parents. The educational categories were coded (1) not a high school graduate, (2) high school graduate, (3) some college, (4) four-years of college, and (5) an advanced degree. The SES of a grade is indicated by the mean of its members' scores.
Because the SES measures are based on different sources (teachers and pupils) and dimensions (occupation and education), inconsistent findings across grades may arise due to differences in measurement. By the same token, the differences in the measurement of SES can serve to support the reliability of the findings if consistent effects are observed across grade levels.
School system performance. The California Assessment Program employs a matrix sampling technique, wherein 14 different forms of achievement tests are administered at each grade level tested. School and district level scores of pupils' academic performance were available in three broad content areas: language, reading, and mathematics. We found that the three scores were strongly correlated and, accordingly, used their mean for our measure of the performance of each grade in a school or school district. The least reliable of the eight performance measures was the sixth-grade-district level measure (Cronbach's a = .933).
Areal divisions. The metropolitan division includes all school systems in 10 of the 58 counties of the state (Alameda, Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, San Diego, San Francisco, Santa Barbara, Santa Clara, and Ventura) plus the city systems of Bakersfield (Bakersfield City Elementary and Kern Union High), Fresno (Fresno Unified), Sacramento (Sacramento City Unified and San Juan Unified), and Stockton (Stockton City Unified). The nonmetropolitan division includes all the school systems that did not fall in one of the metropolitan regions of the state. Hence, school systems in Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas predominated in one division and did not in the other.
Correlation Matrix
The correlations, means and standard deviations of the variables are given in Table  1 . Because the numbers of schools and districts are substantial, and because these data represent a census of schools and districts in the state of California, the value of reporting significance tests is problematic. Nevertheless, we report them. More emphasis will be placed on the pattern and magnitude of the observed effects than on the matter of statistical significance.
Note the high correlations in Table 1 between the interaction term (SIZ*SES) and SIZ (especially among districts) and between the interaction term and SES (especially among schools). The multicolinearity that is suggested by these correlations is a potential source of instability in the estimated regression coefficients. That is, if multicolinearity is serious in these data, differences in the correlations upon which the regression coefficients are based should result in large differences in the estimates of the regression coefficients. Accordingly, to form our conclusions we will rely heavily on an analysis of the consistency of the pattern (or qualitative form) of the findings across the various replications.
Formal Model
Any inquiry that employs nonexperimental data and an aggregated (school system level) measure of academic performance, must rely on numerous assumptions to justify a causal interpretation of its findings. Our inquiry is no exception and, hence, a formal statement of the more important of these assumptions is called for.
Let Pij equal the academic performance of pupil i in school system j; let Sij equal the SES of pupil i in school system j; let SJ equal the mean SES of the pupils in school system j\ let Nj equal the number of pupils in school system j\ let Oj equal the degree of opportunity for the improvement of aca- (1) will be unbiased. In Equation 1 the coefficient estimated for 5.7 captures both the direct effect of a pupil's SES and the total effect the school system's SES. The coefficient estimated for Nj gives the relative contributions of the positive and negative mechanisms that link school sys tem size to performance. Lastly, the coeffi cient estimated for S.JNj gives the effect (which we have hypothesized) of Sj on the relative contributions of these positive and negative mechanisms.
Results
Our hypothesis specifies a nonadditive ef fect of school system size on performance; however, for purposes of comparison with previous studies, we first report the additive effect of size. From Table 1 we can see that the correlations between system size and performance (PER) are weak. At the third, sixth, and eighth grade levels the correlations are negative and range in value from -.198 to -.033. At the 12th grade level the corre lations are positive: .243 and .149 for the districts and schools, respectively. Regres sion estimates of the effects of size on per formance, based on the model PER = Øo + Øi(SIZ) + 0 2 (SES) + U are reported in Table 2 . The findings support a conclusion that school system size generally has a slight negative influence on performance.
The picture is importantly altered upon the introduction of an interaction between SIZ and SES: PER = Øo + Øi(SIZ) + Ø2(SES) + Ø3(SIZ*SES) + U. Table 3 gives the results of estimating size effects with this new model. The effect of SIZ is uniformly negative and, relative to the effect of SES, large in magnitude. The SIZ*SES interaction is uniformly positive and, relative to the effect of SES, large in magnitude.
With a noteworthy interaction between SIZ and SES, neither the coefficient for SIZ nor the coefficient for SES can be interpreted apart from the coefficient for SIZ*SES. The total effect of SIZ on PER is given by the partial derivative 0! + Ø3(SES).
The standardized effect of SIZ is obtained by multiplying the partial derivative by the standard deviation of SIZ and dividing by the standard deviation of PER. The derived standardized effect indicates the change in performance (in units of standard deviation) that is expected with a change in SIZ of one standard deviation, among those school systems with a particular SES.
The estimated standardized effects of SIZ for various values of SES are shown in Table  4 . The pattern of effects is uniform: as SES increases, the effect of SIZE on PER goes from negative to positive. Therefore, depending on the SES of the school system, these results indicate that one may find negative, negligible, or positive effects of SIZ on PER. Note that strong positive effects of SIZ do not appear in these data; the strong effects are the negative effects of SIZ among low SES school systems. We have replicated the above analysis among the schools and districts within two areal divisions of the state. School systems in metropolitan settings (Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas) predominated in one division and did not in the other. The results are given in Table 5 . With one exception (sixth-grade-district school systems in the metro division), the previously observed pattern of results is maintained.
Discussion
Our work in this paper is broadly consistent with the assertion of contingency theory that organizational structure has effects which depend on such conditions as technology and uncertainty (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Lorsch & Morse, 1974; Child, 1975; Evers, Bohlen, & Warren, 1976; Khandwalla, 1973) . Our aim has been to understand how various effects of size on performance might arise. According to our scheme, positive effects of size on performance may emerge in high SES contexts because in such contexts increases in school system size generate many opportunities for improved system performance and few constraints on allocation of system resources. Conversely, negative effects of size on performance may emerge in low SES contexts because in such contexts increases in size generate few opportunities and many constraints. Our principal argument is that contextual variables influence the relative contributions of the positive and negative effects of size on performance. In this way, relationships between school system size and performance of different strengths and direc- tions can be understood within a single, coherent, theoretical scheme. We have brought California Assessment Program data to bear on the theory. A robust qualitative finding emerged: as the SES of a school system goes up, the association between the size and performance of school systems goes from negative to positive. We also found that the negative association among low SES school systems is much stronger in magnitude than the positive association among high SES school systems.
Thus, it appears that school system size has strong negative effects on performance that are eliminated, but not strongly reversed, in high SES settings. This pattern of findings holds for third, sixth, eighth, and 12th grades among both schools and school districts. It holds for school systems in both metropolitan and nonmetropolitan settings. The pattern is the same when SES is measured in terms of teacher reports of parents' occupational attainment (third and sixth grade levels) or when SES is measured in terms of student reports of parents' educational attainments (eighth and 12th grade levels).
However, our conclusions must be tentative. Although the regression analysis has generated results that are consistent with the prediction of our theory, the analysis is likely to violate many of the assumptions that must hold in order to justify causal inferences. Hence, we are not ready to assert that large, low SES school systems ought to be broken into smaller units; nor are we ready to assert that opportunities for economies of scale might be best pursued among school systems that are relatively high in their SES in light of the finding that variations in size have no negative consequences on performance in such school systems. The settlement of the important policy issues that are raised by our theory and these California data must await additional evidence of a different sort.
Future empirical work might employ individual-level data in a sampling design that stratifies school systems by their size, their SES, or both. Longitudinal designs can be useful, although they are not a panacea. Additional indicators of school system performance might serve not only to reveal the broader implications (if any) of variations in school system size, but also to validate the employment of system-level academic achievement scores as general indicators of school system performance. With the recent developments in multilevel (hierarchical) statistical modeling (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1987; Mason, Wong, & Entwistle, 1983) , it may be possible to disentangle the relative contributions of district and school sizes to performances measured at district, school, and individual levels.
Finally and most important to the development of confident claims in this field, future work might include measures of the intervening conditions that presumably link variations in system size to various performance outcomes. We have examined the reduced form equation of our causal model. The guts of the model-the various conditions that we have discussed under the headings of opportunities and constraints-remain to be examined with respect to their role in transmitting effects of size. Pathanalytic decompositions of the total effects of size on performance, (see Sobel, 1987 on the general method) are probably best pursued among low SES school systems where these total effects appear to be most pronounced. Notes 1 We assert this mainly on probabilistic grounds; however, there also may be a system selectivity component to the association. Smaller school systems that do not have the means to provide costly services to special populations often make arrangements to place such students in larger systems.
